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SEEDTIME OF AN AMERICAN JUDICIARY: FROM
INDEPENDENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION
WmLAm F. SWInDLER*
THE CLOSiNG OF THE ROYAL COu-RTS
In the increasing disputes between the colonies and the mother coun-
try preceding the war for independence, the nature of law and of the
courts in British North America periodically came into question. Colonial
leaders pointed retrospectively to the assumption, embodied in the earliest
colonial charters, that the common law, modified to apply to the local
needs of each settlement or "plantation," was the root stock of American
jurisprudence.1 Once the issue of the authority of the common law in
the colonies was belatedly raised, English authorities countered with
the declaration that neither the common law nor the English Constitu-
tion followed the flag except as England decreed.2 Essentiallv, this was
the impasse on which the hope of avoiding revolution ultimately
perished.
Although their authority to do so might be called into question, the
colonies proceeded to adopt or adapt the common law, setting up sys-
tems of courts resembling the judicial structure remembered from Eng-
* John Marshall Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
Editor-Portions of this paper will appear in a chapter in a forthcoming book, Justice
'76, sponsored by the American Judicature Society and edited by Glenn R. Winters,
retired director of the Society, and Tazewell Taylor Visiting Professor of Law, College
of William and Mary.
1. For example, the frequently quoted language of the Virginia Charter of 1606 entitled
the colonists to "all liberties, franchises, and immunities, .. . as if they had been abiding
and born, within this our Realm of England." 7 F. THoRPE, AmmcN CmrMas, CoN-
STITUTIONS, AND ORGAIc LAWS 3788 (1909).
2. The conflict between colonial and imperial viewpoints is discussed in the opening
portion of Swindler, "The Rights of Englishmen" Since 1776: Some Anglo-American
Notes, 124 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1083 (1976). Representative of the language that created the
argument concerning the applicability of the English common law to the North Ameri-
can colonies is this passage from the Connecticut Charter of 1662: "We do for Us, Our
Heirs and Successors, ordain, declare, and grant unto the said .. . Subjects . . . which
shall go to inhabit within the said Colony, and every of their Children .... all Liberties
and Immunities ... as if they ... were born within the realm of England ...:'
1 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 533. The colonists believed the incorporation of the
English common law set out in the charters was an entitlement; English authorities
considered it a privilege granted and revocable by the Crown.
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land, but modified to the needs of each colony. Whatever the particular
variations at the level of courts of first instance, one feature of the co-
lonial judicial system was consistent: appeals lay from each colony di-
rectly to the Privy Council in London.4 Thus, when independence was
declared, that appellate system became extinct for practical purposes.
A new state constitution might undertake to create a new internal judi-
cial system, both trial and appellate, but it could not fill completely the
vacuum left by the defunct system of royal justice; beyond the individ-
ual jurisdiction of the state, there was no judicial machinery for the
settlement of issues involving interstate and international questions.
The Declaration of Independence finalized the suspension of royal ad-
ministration of justice in the colonies, but when that instrument was
adopted by the Second Continental Congress in the summer of 1776,
the royal courts had been closed for varying periods of time. The Massa-
chusetts Government Act of 17740 had reorganized the administration
of justice in that recalcitrant province, and the action of the provincial
ad hoc assembly that responded to the parliamentary coercion marked
the effective end -of the royal court system in the colony. In the fall of
1775 Lord Dunmore extinguished the royal court system in Virginia by
placing the colony under martial law. Indeed, the actions of all the colo-
nies the previous winter, in assembling to elect delegates to the Second
Continental Congress, had evidenced the end of the royal system.
Once before, in the Stamp Act crisis, the courts had closed their
doors and suspended business.6 The finality of the break with England
led to similar action; in Virginia the last session of the colonial assembly,
acting in response to Dunmore's general suspension of civil power, pro-
nounced it impossible for the civil courts to continue. Eighteen months
later, the assembly enacted legislation to permit their reopening.' In
3. Among various studies on the colonial judicial system, see J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGH-
TON, LAW ENFORcEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK (1944); G. HASKINS, LAW AND Au-
THORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSEMtS (1960); W. NELSON, THE AMERICANZATION OF TH
COMMON LAW (1975); A. STOKES, A VIEW OF THE CONSTTrUTON OF THE BRITISH COLONIES
IN NORTH AMERIC A AND THE WEST INDIES (1783, reprinted 1969).
4. See J. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE ParVy COuNcIL FROM THE AMERIcAN PLANTATIONS
(1950).
5. 14 Geo. 3, c. 39.
6. See E. MORGAN, PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DocUMENTs ON THE STAMP
AcT CRsis, 1764266, at 104-26 (1959).
7. 9 STATUTEs AT LAaGE OF VIRGINIA 368 (ch. 3, 1777) (W. Hening ed. 1819-23, re-
printed 1969) [hereinafter cited as Hen. (Va.)]:
Whereas the troubles in which this commonwealth hath been involved,
and its distressed circumstances, induced the general convention, by several
[Vol. 17:503
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most states where similar action was taken, the structure and procedure
of the courts remained unchanged. What did change was the extrajuris-
dictional situation, from a relation between colony and Crown on a
colony-by-colony basis, to an interstate, and finally to a national-:-state,
relation. Independence had broad consequences for the administration
of justice in the new United States. Not only did the official hiatus be-
tween the colonial system and the new federal-state system of judicial
organization create disputes that required settlement following the Revo-
lution,-8 but there was also the problem of discontinuity of the system of
law itself. The "reception" of the common law and the retention in force
of selected parliamentary enactments required affirmative initiative by
the new legislatures.9 Further, the question of judicial independence had
to be resolved. Although some constitutional theorists assumed that the
English concept of justice as an ingredient of the executive function
would be retained, the prevailing doctrine of separation of powers
moved in an opposite direction. 10 What was of greater importance was
the independence of the judiciary, not from the other branches of gov-
ernment, but from the electorate."
Thus, the nascence of the American judiciary was not an effortless
duplication of English forms. States were required to develop, judicial
structures suited to their needs, and the new nation was obliged to devise
judicial machinery to -substitute effectively for the jurisdiction of the
resolutions, to recommend it to the courts of justice not to proceed to the
trial of suits, ... and it is now judged indispensably necessary that all the
said courts should be opened, for the general administration of justice: Be
it therefore enacted ... That all the said resolutions of convention . . .
are hereby repealed.
8. A common form of controversy involved claims of English creditors against
colonial debtors; such disputes were exacerbated by wartime sequestering statutes pur-
porting to extinguish the liability. See, e.g., 9 Hen. (Va.) 377 (ch. 9, 1777). Like the
proliferating interstate questions that awaited a national forum for adjudication, the
adjustment of pre-Revolutionary claims by postwar settlements was not finally effectu-
ated until a viable national power had been established under the Constitution of 1787.
Cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 199 (1796).
9. See, e.g., 9 Hen. (Va.) 126, § 6 (ch. 5, 1776). See also E. BROWN, SUwvivAL OF
BRIIsH STATuTEs IN A.MtmcAN LAW, 1776-1836 (1964).
10. See 1 J. GoEBEI, HisroRy oF THE SUPaEmE CouRT or rnm UNrrD STATES: ANTE-
CEDENTS AND BFINNIN S TO 1801, at 50-142 (1971).
11. Although the first state constitutions did not provide for electoral control over
the judiciary, the impetus of Jacksonian democracy, a half century later, would cause
many state judicial articles to be rewritten. For a general discussion of this development,
see JusrcE '76 (G. Winters ed.) (to be published in 1976 by the American Judicature
Society) [hereinafter cited as Jus'nct '76).
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Crown over interstate and international disputes. The steps taken to lay
this foundation commenced the evolution of the American judiciary.
JUDICIAL STRUCTURES IN THE NEW STATES
Eleven of the thirteen states drafted constitutions for themselves fol-
lowing independence; Connecticut and Rhode Island were content to
continue their governments under their colonial charters.12 The consti-
tutional provisions generally eschewed innovative efforts to restructure
the judicial power; the language assumed a continuation of the pre-Revo-
lutionary court system. Another assumption was that the paramountcy
of legislative power would limit and define the jurisdiction and authority
of the judiciary.'3 Thus, in the first decade after independence, the
constitutional references to the court structure were concerned with
general functions, and the details of organization, procedure, and juris-
diction were adjusted eventually by legislation.
All of the original states provided for appointment of judges in the
major courts: by the governor alone in two states, by the legislature
alone in four, and by the governor and one or both houses of the legis-
lature in the remainder. Nine states provided for life tenure (including
tenure "during good behavior"), two for annual appointments, one for
terms of 3 years, another for terms of 5 to 7 years14 (see table I). Except
12. The 11 original states, and the 3 admitted up to 1800, that drafted constitutions,
adopted them on the following dates: New Hampshire, 1776, 1784, 1792; Massachusetts,
1780; New York, 1777; New Jersey, 1776; Pennsylvania, 1776, 1790; Delaware, 1776, 1792;
Maryland, 1776; Virginia, 1776; North Carolina, 1776; South Carolina, 1776, 1778, 1790;
Georgia, 1777, 1789, 1798; Vermont, 1793 (following prestatehood drafts of 1777 and
1786); Kentucky, 1792, 1799; Tennessee, 1796. Connecticut finally adopted a constitution
in 1818; Rhode Island followed in 1842. For early state constitutions including all
states in alphabetical order through Missouri, see SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATEs CoNsrTIUToNs (W. Swindler ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SoURcES Am
DocuMENTS]; for the remaining states, see F. THORPE, supra note 1.
13. See 1 J. GOEBEI, supra note 10, at 96-142.
[Tihe affirmation of the status quo was a mere stop-gap subject to future
correction not by constitutional amendment but by statute, and this be-
cause of a deep-rooted and pervasive belief that the ordering of the judicial
system should be committed to the legislative branch. For nearly a century
the veritable cordon sanitaire maintained by the Crown against legislative
trifling with the judicial structure had prevented the translation of beliefs
into action, but they remained animate because of an enduring sense of
grievance.
Id. at 97.
14. See W. SMITi, A COMPARATIVE Vmw OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF TlE SEVERAL STATES
WITH EACH OmE, AND WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES 7-11 (1796).
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in states requiring annual appointment of judges, where the legislature
could choose not to approve reappointment, removal was by impeach-
ment, according to specified procedures. 5
TABLE I. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF STATE JUDIcIARY
State
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Marylarid
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Source: See W.
Appointment
governor and council
governor and council
legislature
legislature
governor and council
governor and legislature
governor
governor
governor and council
legislature
governor and legislature
legislature
legislature
SMITH, A CoMPARATVE ViEw
Tenure
life&
life
annual
annual
life
5-7 years
life
life
life
life
life
life
3 years
Removability
impeachmentb
impeachment
nonreappointment
nonreappointment
impeachmente
impeachment
impeachment or addressd
impeachment or address
impeachment or address
impeachment
impeachment
impeachment
impeachment
oF rM CONSTITUTIONS OF =im SEVERAL
STATES WITH EACH OTHER, AND'WITH THAT OF THE UNITEm STATEs 8-10 (1796).
a i.e., "during good behavior."
b Impeachment procedure took various forms, charges being brought by one branch
of government and trial by another.
0 New York was the only state to provide for automatic retirement at age 65.
d "Address" was a formal legislative request to the chief executive of the state to per-
form a specific act. In Pennsylvania, removal of a judge was an alternative to impeach-
ment; in other states, address was the formal sequel to a conviction on impeachment.
Students of the first state constitutions insist that the documents
comprised two classes, those trying to preserve the existing order and
those attempting to replace it,'6 but the provisions on the judicial power
generally continued the organizational principles of the colonial era.
Most state constitutions provided for the familiar general jurisdiction
courts, including those charged with civil actions (superior courts, or
courts of common pleas), criminal actions (oyer and terminer, gaol
delivery, general sessions), and chancery. Some states had specialized
and limited jurisdiction courts (orphans, small claims, probate), and all
had some court of general appellate jurisdiction (supreme court, court
of appeals, court of errors). Some continued the English practice of
15. Cf. R. BFRGER, IMPEACHMENT: ThE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 141-53 (1973).
16. See, e.g., A. NEViNS, THE AMEmCAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THlE REVOLUTION,
1775-1789, at 139, 157 (1927); G. Woon, Tim CREATION OF Tim AMERICAN REPUBLC,
1776-1787, at 391-469 (1969).
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putting the judicial system as a whole under a chancellor, though this
plan of administration bore little resemblance to the "unified court sys-
tem" of the 20th century.17
The constitutional language in the 11 states drafting such instruments
varied from succinct and general statements, if it was manifest that the
paramount responsibility over the judicial process was to be left to the
legislature,18 to elaborate articles such as those developed by Delaware
for its second constitution in 1792.'" Quickly ratifying the Constitution
of 1787 as a means of insuring its permanent transition from its status as
the semiautonomous "three lower counties" of Pennsylvania (having a
separate legislature but a common governor in colonial times) to sove-
reign statehood, Delaware in its 1776 constitution had established final
judicial authority in a court of appeals that had "all the . . . powers
heretofore given by law in the last resort to the King in council, under
the old government." 20
When used to enforce unpopular enactments of Parliament, the judi-
cial system "under the old government" had been one cause of the
colonial grievances, but after 1776, by, constitutional stipulation or by
legislative provision, the states sought to convert the same system to
their own purposes. Table II summarizes details of judicial organization
in the 16 states that constituted the Union by the end of the first quarter
century of independence. For the original 13 states, the common denomi-
nators and the contrasts in the judicial function serve both to emphasize
the objectives of the formulation of a national court system in the Con-
stitution of 1787 and in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and to underscore
the initial objections to the federal courts.
The Theory of the Judicial Function
The state constitutions implicitly or explicitly accepted the doctrine
of separation of powers, though in many documents some control of
17. See JusncE '76, supra note 11. See generally table II infra.
18. See, e.g., 4 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 2451 (New Hampshire Constitution of
1776).
19. Articles 17 and 18 of the Delaware Constitution of 1776 essentially continued the
colonial system without specific procedural details; the Delaware Constitution of 1792,
however, had a 21-section judicial article. See 2 SouacS AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 12,
at 202, 210-12.
The Virginia Constitution of 1776 made only perfunctory reference to the court
system, and left it to the state legislature to administer the judiciary. See 7 F. THORPE,
supra note 1, at 3812, 3819 (Virginia Constitutions of 1776, 1830).
20. DaL. CONsr. art. 17 (1776), in 2 SouRCEs AND DocUMENTs, supra note 12, at 202.
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the judicial process was vested in the legislative branch. As table I indi-
cates, the independence of judges generally was accepted, despite the
animosity bred by the royal judges in the last years before the Revolu-
tion. Original and appellate jurisdictions, as one writer has observed,
rarely were sharply distinguished,2' and few of the first constitutions
made as definite a provision for last resort as did the Delaware instru-
ment of 1792.22 Four states, Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, and
South Carolina, scarcely mentioned the judiciary in their first sketchy
constitutions; their succeeding instruments, however, generally set out
in detail provisions on their courts. 23
Jurisdiction
By the time of the drafting of the judicial article in the Federal Con-
stitution in 1787, a decade of experience in the states had enabled the
delegates at Philadelphia to distinguish between original and appellate
jurisdictions for the new national courts. This decade had marked the
transition from the practices of colonial times, when final appeal lay
to London, to the needs of a federal system, under which final appeal
first had been carried of necessity to the judicial agencies established by
the Continental Congress, and at last to the Supreme Court. In some
states, the highest courts actually were limited to appellate jurisdiction,24
but until well into the 19th century a sharp distinction was not consis-
tently drawn; hence the divisions of judicial functions suggested in
table II can be considered only as general or potential. The first clear
jurisdictional distinction was rather between general courts and limited
or special courts.
Procedure
Most of the early state constitutions left the rules of procedure either
to the courts themselves or to the legislatures, with the usages of the
common law serving as a guideline. From the first decade after inde-
pendence emerged a picture of state judicial systems retaining both the
21. See L. FiuwmAN, A HISTORY OF AMRICAN LAW 123-25 (1973).
22. See note 19 supra & accompanying text.
23. See 2 Soxacas AND DocUmENTS, supra note 12, at 202, 210-12 (Delaware Constitue
tions of 1776, 1792); id. at 448, 454, 463 (Georgia Constitutions of 1777, 1789, 1798);
4 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 2451, 2453, 2471 (New Hampshire Constitutions of 1776,
1784, 1792); 6 F. THORPE supra note 1, at 3241, 3248, 3258 (South Carolina Constitutions
of 1776, 1778, 1790).
24. See, e.g., Mn. CoNsr. art. 56 (1776), in 3 F. THoRPE, supra note 1, at 1700.
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names and functions of the antecedent colonial period. This continuity
is not surprising, because courts are designed to adjudicate the peculiar
needs of social and economic, not political, organization. Therefore, a
change in the social and economic character of American life was a pre-
requisite to a change in the judicial system; only the political structure of
British North America had changed in 1781, with victory at Yorktown
in the struggle for independence.
TABLE II. REPRESENTATIVE STATE COURTS THAT SUCCEEDED THE
ROYAL COURT SYSTEM
Type of Jurisdiction
appellate jurisdiction
general civil jurisdiction
general criminal jurisdiction
equity jurisdiction
special and limited jurisdiction
Commentary
colonial system usually vested final review in legis-
lature; state constitutions established supreme courts
(as in Massachusetts), courts of errors and appeals
(as in New York, Delaware)
characterized by jury trials at common law, particu-
larly in common pleas courts; nisi prius and superior
courts retained nomenclature of colonial times
general criminal courts were oyer and terminer and
gaol delivery (as in New Jersey); quarter sessions
courts usually were limited to minor offenses (as in
Connecticut, New Hampshire)
chancery courts (as in New Jersey, Virginia) were
few, and the English office of chancellor as a gen-
eral head of the judicial system was emulated only in
one state (New York)
these were of two general classes: courts for ad-
ministration of estates and wards (variously called
ordinary, orphans, prerogative, or probate), and courts
for small claims or fines (including New York City
exchequer, Georgia court of conscience, and gen-
erally the justices of the peace)
The constitutional statement of the judicial function in the new states
typically was English colonial; this is borne out by the list in table II
of representative courts of this post-independence period. "Americaniza-
tion" had taken place, but it had been going on through most of the
colonial period.25 The manifest need in the new nation was for a judicial
structure that would replace the only court apparatus that in fact had
been extinguished by the Revolution: final appeal and review by the
royal courts. In the view of many state leaders in the early period of in-
25. See table H1 supra.
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dependence, the only necessary function of a national judiciary was to
dispose of issues of first instance in the sovereign states that were funda-
mentally related to the national interest as formerly they would have
been related to the imperial interest.26 The ultimate development of an
American judiciary, state and national, thus had to await the lessons
of experience under the transition from empire to a "perpetual union."
The prize cases and territorial disputes under the Articles of Confedera-
tion were to provide the most meaningful of these lessons.
THE CONFEDERATION EXPERIENCE: PRIzE CASE APPEALS
As the British and Continental armies maneuvered for confrontation,
ships commissioned by the erstwhile colonies undertook their own
offensive, aimed at harrassing the maritime commerce of the mother
country. General Washington immediately perceived the legal prob-
lems that would arise as the captors brought their prizes into American
ports, to have their claims adjudicated by local admiralty courts. The
experience under the vice-admiralty courts established by England in
the years prior to independence had been a major cause of colonial
complaint27 ; among a dozen new states acutely conscious of their own
sovereignty, it was obvious that serious conflicts could develop. The
remedy was equally obvious: an interstate judicial body to review the
issues in dispute.
In October, 1775, Washington advised the Continental Congress of
the problem, and on November 25 a committee that had considered the
matter suggested the formation of a special committee on prize ap-
peals.2 8 The models for the proposed body presumably were the stand-
ing or ad hoc judicial committees of the House of Lords and the general
British procedures regulating privateering.29 This system operated in
Congress from September, 1776, to the following January.30 A standing
committee then was established, and functioned from January, 1777, 81
26. Cf. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119, 124 (M. Farr
ed. 1937) (comments of John Rutledge) [hereinafter cited as REcoRDs OF mE FEDEi
CONVES ON].
27. See C. UBBELoHDE, THE VIC E-ADMIRALTY CoUtRs AND THm AmERUcAN REVOLUTION
(1960).
28. 3 JoURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CoNGRESS 1774-1789, at 371-75 (W. Ford, et al.
eds. 1904-37) [hereinafter cited as JOURNALS OF THE COIENAL CONGRESS].
29. See 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 10, at 148.
30. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 542.
31. 7 JoURNALs OF THm CONTnNTAL CoNGREss 75.
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to May, 1780, when the first national court in American history was
established: the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. The resolution
creating this court outlined its structure and jurisdiction:
Resolved. That a court be established for the trial of all appeals
from the courts of admiralty in these United States, in cases of cap-
ture, to consist of three judges, appointed and commissioned by
Congress, either two of whom, in the absence of the other, to hold
the said court for the despatch of business:
That the said court appoint their own register:
That the trials therein be according to the usage of nations and
not by jury:
That the said judges hold their first session as soon as may be
at Philadelphia; and afterwards at such times and places as they
shall judge most conducive to the public good, so that they do not
at any time sit further eastward than Hartford, in Connecticut, or
southward, than Williamsburg, in Virginia .... 32
William Paca of Maryland, Titus Hosmer of Connecticut, and Cyrus
Griffin of Virginia eventually were appointed as the first "national"
judges, but Hosmer died within a few months and never sat on this
court, and Paca resigned the following year to become governor of his
state. George Read of Delaware and John Lowell of Massachusetts
eventually were appointed to serve with Griffin, whose tenure was
virtually coextensive with the life of the court, from 1780 until 1786.3
TABLE III. DIsPosITIoN OF PRIZE CASES ON APPEAL
State of Origin No. Cases Aff'd Rev'd Dism'd No Action
Committee of Appeals
New Hampshire .............. 2 2
Massachusetts ................. 11 6 4 1
Rhode Island ................. 7 2 4 1
Connecticut ................... 4 4
New Jersey ................... 10 4 4 1 1
Pennsylvania .................. 10 6 3 1
Delaware ..................... 4 1 3
Maryland ..................... 3 1 2
Virginia ...................... 1 1
32. 16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 61.
33. See H. CARSON, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPRFME COURT OF Tm UNrrED STATES 55-57
(1902, reprinted 1971).
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North Carolina ................ 5 2 2 1
South Carolina ................ 2 1 1
Georgia ...................... 2 1 1
Court of Appeals
New Hampshire ............... 1 1
Massachusetts ................. 15 7 4 1 3
Rhode Island .................. 3 1 2
Connecticut ................... 12 1 6 4 1
New Jersey ................... 4 2 1 1
Pennsylvania .................. 1 1
Delaware ..................... 1 1
Maryland ..................... 1 1
Virginia ...................... 1 1
North Carolina ................ 8 3 2 3
Sources: 131 U.S. xxxv-xliv (J. Davis, Appendix 1889); H. CARso.,, Tim HISToRY oF
TiE SvPRamE CouRT OF THE UNTE STATES 61-65 (1902, reprinted 1971); 1 J. GoEBr,
HISTORY OF Tfm SuPREME CouRT oF T-E UNITmD STATES: ANTEcEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO
1801, at 143-82 (1971).
As can be seen in table III, the record of the Court of Appeals in Cases
of Capture was substantial, considering the specialized jurisdiction of the
court. The considerable variation in procedural and substantive law at
the level of first instance, and the disparity between the law construed
and applied by the state courts and by the court of appeals, which was
charged with conducting its review according to the practices of nations,
emphasized the need for a uniform system to adjudicate disputes con-
cerning prizes. Although records are incomplete, nearly 120 cases are
known to have come before the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture
or its predecessor committee; eight of these decisions were reported in
Dallas's second volume of court reports.34 The state judgments were up-
held in 39 appeals and were reversed in 42; other appeals were dismissed
or otherwise settled without review.35 These figures in themselves docu-
ment the need at that time for a national judicial system.
From the outset, the reluctance of the states to acknowledge appellate
jurisdiction hindered the functioning of the national system. The lang-
uage of state legislation often explicitly limited appeals to a higher court
within the state jurisdiction or was sufficiently ambiguous to enable
states to determine the legality of an appeal to the national court.8 After
34. See, e.g., The Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1 (Ct. App. Cas. Cap. 1781).
35. See table I supra.
36. See I J. GoEB L, supra note 10, at 160-71.
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the Revolution, several of the states amended their laws to prevent taking
an appeal out of the jurisdiction.3 7 Although the court of appeals de-
livered opinions that appear to have been accepted as authoritative by
other powers,, and subsequently were incorporated into the rules of
decision of the Federal Supreme Court,39 its accomplishments were
manifestly unpopular with states whose judgments were overruled, and
the subject area with which it dealt was too arcane to catch the popular
imagination.
THE CONFEDERATION EXPERIENCE: THE INTERSTATE LAND DISPUTES
The Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, despite its deficiencies, rep-
resented an attempt to provide a national court structure for interstate
disputes. An ad hoe body under the control of the Continental Con-
gress was charged with resolving another subject of legal controversy
in which extrastate jurisdiction was manifestly needed: the numerous
disputes over boundaries and the "western lands" claimed by several of
the former colonies. As a general proposition, the "landless" states de-
manded as a price of ratification of the Articles of Confederation that
the great western tracts be turned over to the nation; indeed, these ces-
sions had been made by the time the Articles took effect, on March 1,
1781. There remained a substantial number of questions that became
subject to article 9, which in part provided: "The United States, in
Congress assembled, shall ... be the last resort on appeal in all disputes
and differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two
or more states, concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause
whatever ... .,,40 The procedure for congressional disposition of such
issues then was set out in detail:
[W]henever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent
of any State, in controversy with another, shall present a petition to
Congress stating the matter in question and praying for a hearing,
notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative
or executive authority of the other state in controversy, and a day
assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents,
who shall then be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commis-
37. See 13 JoURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 281-84.
38. See H. CARsON, supra note 33, at 61-64.
39. See Penhallow v. Roane's Administrators, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 116 (opinion of
CUSMNG, J.).
40. 9 JouRNALs oF TH CONTiNENTAL CONGRESS 916.
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sioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining
the matter in question; but if they cannot agree, Congress shall name
three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of
such persons, each party shall alternately strike out one, the peti-
tioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen;
and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names,
as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of Congress be drawn
out by lot, and the persons whose names shall be so drawn or any
five of them shall be commissioners or judges to hear and finally
determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges
who shall hear the cause, shall agree in the determination .... 41
Half a dozen such disputes were presented to Congress under this pro-
vision: only one was pursued to final judgment, one was never formally
submitted to the national jurisdiction, and the remainder were settled
out of "court." 
4 2
Two cases illustrate the difficult experiences of the attempted adjudi-
cation of interstate land claims by the Continental Congress: the lengthy
controversy over the "Hampshire grants," which ultimately became
the state of Vermont, and the equally protracted dispute over the
Wyoming Valley, in northern Pennsylvania. The first dispute reached
a 20-year climax in January, 1777, when the settlers in the region be-
tween New York and New Hampshire declared themselves an indepen-
dent state.43 New York delegates petitioned the Congress to undertake
an arbitration of the matter, the procedures under the Articles not yet
having been drafted. Three years later, New York and New Hamp-
shire formally laid their claims before Congress, but sporadic discussion
of the issue was unavailing.44 In 1781, Massachusetts formally recog-
nized Vermont as an independent state; New Hampshire took similar
action in the same year. A decade later New York gave up the strug-
gle and the Federal Congress admitted Vermont to the Union.4
The Wyoming Valley issue was the only full-scale adjudication carried
out by Congress under the Articles. Pennsylvania claimed the region under
the grant of 1681 to William Penn 0 ; Connecticut insisted that it held
41. Id. at 916-17.
42. See H. CARSON, supra note 33, at 66-79.
43. 8 JOURNALS OF nm CONTNENTAL CONGRESS 491.
44. See 18 JOuRNALs OF THE COmnTNENTAL CONGRESS 833.
45. Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 191.
46. See 5 F. THORPF, supra note 1, at 3035. See also H. CARSON, supra note 33, at 68-75.
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prior title to the region under its charter of 1662. 4' The Susquehannah
Company, chartered by Connecticut, had organized and settled the valley,
and the state had formally established the settlements as Westmoreland
county, which was duly represented in the Connecticut legislature. In
1778, however, combined bands of Tories and Indians invaded the valley
and decimated the population. Three years later, as new settlers and sur-
viving claimants from Connecticut began moving back, Pennsylvania
petitioned for a settlement of the jurisdictional issue under article 9.48
In 1782, a five-judge court was convened at Trenton, New Jersey, and
sworn in by Justice Isaac Smith of the state supreme court. The judges
selected were Welcome Arnold of Rhode Island, David Brearly and
William C. Houston of New Jersey, William Whipple of New Hamp-
shire, and Cyrus Griffin of Virginia, who was already serving on the
Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture.49 The court took testimony for
more than a month and then returned a unanimous verdict in favor of
Pennsylvania. Two years later an effort was made to reconvene the
court to hear claims of individual tenants of the Wyoming grants, but
the petition was dismissed. The judicial function of Congress obviously
was limited to disputes between states, and did not extend to disputes
between individuals and states.5 0
Aside from enabling the Hampshire grants and the Wyoming Valley
claims to be heard, the boundary resolution process included in the Arti-
cles accomplished little. A border dispute between Virginia and Penn-
sylvania, in 1779, was settled without recourse to Congress." The lack of
a forum in which individuals could litigate interstate claims was demon-
strated in another controversy that began as a territorial conflict be-
tween New Jersey and Virginia, but involved the property and con-
tract interests of George Morgan, one of many agents for seaboard states
seeking to develop western settlements as revenue devices. At issue was
whether New Jersey legally could promote a settlement in territory
claimed by Virginia; the controversy was complicated by the negotia-
tions undertaken by Virginia for cession of the "Ohio" lands to Con-
47. Connecticut continued to function under this charter until adopting a constitution
in 1818. See 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 12, at 131, 144.
48. 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 721; 12 JoURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1070.
49. 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CoxGREss 533.
50. See 9 JoURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 918 ("private right of soil").
51. 131 U.S. liii-llv (J. Davis, Appendix 1889).
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gress. In 1784 the cession was accepted, and an accompanying petition
by Morgan was dismissed.52
A territorial dispute between Massachusetts and New York, in 1784,
led to the selection of judges for a congressional court to meet in Wil-
liamsburg that fall, but the meeting was not held; after 3 years of direct
negotiations between the states, the matter was announced to Congress
to have been settled.5 3 A similar interstate settlement in 1786, known as
the "treaty of Beaufort," disposed of a dispute between South Carolina
and Georgia.5 4
THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
In August, 1786, a "grand committee" of the Continental Congress,
charged with undertaking to strengthen the nearly moribund Articles of
Confederation, recommended the addition of 7 new articles to the origi-
nal 13, the 19th being essentially a new judicial article amending and re-
pealing the 9th. Although this recommendation came to naught, it merits
attention for two reasons: first, it was virtually recapitulated in the so-
called Pinckney plan for a new constitution submitted the following
year at the Constitutional Convention; second, its language, seeking to
continue in a different form the limited authority of a national govern-
ment, contrasted fundamentally with what ultimately became article III
of the new Constitution. The article read:
The United States in Congress Assembled shall have the sole and
exclusive power of declaring what offenses against the United States
shall be deemed treason,.. . and power to institute a Federal Judicial
Court for trying and punishing all officers appointed by Congress
for all crimes, offenses, and misbehaviour in their Offices and to
which Court an Appeal shall be allowed from the Judicial Courts
of the several States in all Causes wherein questions shall arise on
the meaning and construction of Treaties entered into by the United
States with any foreign power, or on the Law of Nations, or where-
in any question shall arise respecting any regulations that may here-
after be made by Congress relative to trade and Commerce, or the
Collection of federal Revenues pursuant to powers that shall be
vested in that body or wherein questions of importance may arise
and the United States shall be a party .... 55
52. See id. at lix-ixi.
53. See id. at lxi-lxii.
54. See id. at Ixii-lxiii. See also South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
55. 31 JOURNALS OF TE COmnTNENTAL CONGRESS 497.
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At the convention that met the following year in Philadelphia "for the
sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation," 56
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and Governor Randolph of Vir-
ginia submitted their respective state plans for revision on May 29. 57 On
June 15, William Paterson of New Jersey submitted a plan, agreed upon
by his state and by some of the New York delegation,58 that soon su-
perseded the Pinckney proposal. The ultimate shape of the new Con-
stitution would be influenced by the compromises between the Ran-
dolph and Paterson plans. On the question of the judiciary, the Virginia
proposals originally were as follows:
Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one
or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by
the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good be-
haviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensa-
tion for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be
made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such
increase or diminution, that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribu-
nals shall be to hear and determine in the first instance, and of the
supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all
piracies and felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy;
cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to
such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection
of the National revenue; impeachments of any National officers,
and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.5 9
The Paterson plan closely resembled the Randolph plan in its treat-
ment of the judicial function, as both plans looked to the creation at
the national level of a court system having both original and appellate
jurisdiction in matters of national interest. The Virginia plan, however,
envisioned trial courts separate from the court of last resort; the New
Jersey plan provided for a single tribunal discharging both functions.60
The opposition dissented to the idea of separate trial courts, or of any
federal trial jurisdiction, and John Rutledge of South Carolina and Roger
Sherman of Connecticut quickly joined forces to oppose the suggestion
56. 3 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTIoN, supra note 26, at 13.
57. See 1 RacoiDs OF ThE FDEAL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 20-23 (Randolph
plan); 3 REcoRDs OF ThE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 595-609 (Pinckney plan).
58. 1 RECoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-TION, supra note 26, at 242-45.
59. Id. at 244.
60. See 1 J. GoEBEL, supra note 10, at 204-24.
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that plenary judicial power be vested in the national government."'
James Madison of Virginia and James Wilson of Pennsylvania became
the nucleus of the movement in support of such power."2
Madison believed that, unless a system of inferior courts with final
jurisdiction in appropriate cases was created, the supreme tribunal would
be overwhelmed by duplicative and unnecessary appeals. Remand to the
state court from whose decision an appeal lay, in Madison's opinion,
merely would complete a circular process, because the bias of the judge
or prejudice of the jury was likely to be reimposed. Furthermore, Madi-
son noted the great inconveniences associated with trial de novo in a
national supreme court, particularly pertaining to the presentation of
witnesses.63
Wilson agreed with Madison, and, perhaps thinking of the ex-
perience of the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, contended that
admiralty subjects were of national interest and ought to be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of a national court system."' Rufus King of Massa-
chusetts supported Madison's position, and responded to Sherman's
objection to the national judiciary with the assertion that trials and ap-
peals under a single system of law would tend to reduce litigation and,
therefore, costs.6 5
More controversial were other issues that arose in the course of the
debates, particularly concerning the power of the national court to re-
view decisions of the highest state courts. Some delegates argued that
the national legislature should be allowed to negate state laws; the su-
premacy clause, however, clearly focused on the judiciary as the ulti-
mate arbiter. 6
The advocates of a strong, broadly endowed, and independent national
court system carried all their points, probably because the Virginia and
New Jersey plans had been largely in agreement on this function of the
new national government. As finally drafted and ratified, the judicial
article of the Federal Constitution in many respects reflected the basic
features of the antecedent state instruments, though it also incorporated
provisions that varied significantly from the prior state models.
61. Id. at 211.
62. Id. at 211-12.
63. See 1 RECODS OF Tm FDERAL CNVENTnox, supra note 26, at 124.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 125.
66. See 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 10, at 238-39.
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Section 1 of article III provided only for a Supreme Court, leaving
to the legislative branch the initiative for establishing other federal judi-
cial bodies, if any. In effect, however, and inferentially in the distinction
in section 2 between original and appellate jurisdiction, a complete
federal court structure was anticipated. 67 The first section also com-
mitted the federal system to lifetime tenure of judges, free from the
potential legislative pressure of threatened salary reductions.68
Section 2 undertook to define the nature of federal jurisdiction, using
language somewhat reminiscent of provisions in the Articles of Con-
federation 9 but distinctly different from the jurisdictional statements of
state constitutions. 0 The division of trial and appellate jurisdiction be-
tween the Supreme Court and "inferior" (subordinate) tribunals left to
Congress the primary responsibility for defining details.71
Section 3 anticipated a substantial role for the federal courts in the
adjudication of treason against the United States, but few threats to the
national interest invoking this jurisdiction were to occur. The trial
of Aaron Burr 72 early in the national history, and a few others in the
Civil War 7 and in World War I,74 attest to the paucity of the threats to
state interests. Early drafts of article III envisioned provisions for re-
moval of executive officers by the judicial process, but impeachment, a
function of the legislative rather than the judicial branch, finally was
adopted to perform this function.75
Most of the debates over the judicial. article in the ratifying conven-
tions repeated the views of delegates at Philadelphia. Preservation of
the common law heritage of jury trials was a primary concern that led
ultimately to the reiteration of this guarantee in the Bill of Rights. The
need for written safeguards of individual rights, also to be embodied in
the first ten amendments and tacitly directed to the attention of the new
national judiciary, frequently was stressed. Aside from some grumbling
67. See 2 REcoRas oF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 132-33.
68. Id. at 186.
69. See notes 18-19, 23 supra.
70. Cf. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (limited
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts; not all actions cognizable by state tribunals fall
within federal jurisdiction).
71. See table IV infra.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (No. 14,693) (C.C. Va. 1807).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Greiner, 26 F. Cas. 36 (No. 15,262) (ED. Pa. 1861).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Werner, 247 F. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1918).
75. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 65, 66 (A. Hamilton).
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over the expense of a dual system of courts and over the prospective con-
flicts between separate bodies of state and national law, article III gen-
erated few of the passionate disputes that arose over the legislative and
executive articles. 76
Ratification progressed with moderate speed. In December, 1787,
some 90 days after the Philadelphia convention rose from its labor, Dela-
ware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey had given their approval. Georgia
and Conr-.cticut followed in January, 1788, and Massachusetts in Feb-
ruary. Th,. first setback in the momentum came in March when Rhode
Island voted in the negative, but since Rhode Island had not partici-
pated in the Philadelphia convention the action was less than cataclys-
mic. 77 Maryland gave its approval in April and South Carolina in May;
New Hampshire on June 21 became the ninth state to ratify.78 Because,
under the terms of article VII, this gave the necessary majority to put
the new instrument into effect, the Constitution was nominally adopted,
but as a practical matter it was obvious that the approval of the two
strategic states of Virginia and New York was necessary. Virginia rati-
fied June 26, and New York a month later on July 2 6.79 As perorations to
the advocacy for the new Constitution, two particularly pregnant state-
ments on the national judicial power were recorded in these final con-
ventions. Alexander Hamilton wrote:
[T]here ought always to be a constitutional method of giving
efficacy to constitutional provisions. What for instance would avail
restrictions on the authority of the state legislatures, without
some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them?
The states, by the plan of the convention are prohibited from doing
a variety of things, some of which are incompatible with the in-
terests of the union, and others with the principles of good govern-
ment.... No man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions would
be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the gov-
ermnent to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power
must either be a direct negative on the state laws, or an authority
in the federal courts, to overrule such as might be in manifest con-
travention of the articles of Union.80
76. See DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTON (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as ELOT's DEBATEs].
77. See 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 10, at 357-59.
78. See S. BLooM, FORmATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 60 (1937).
79. Id.
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 516 (E. Earle ed. 1937).
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In June, 1788, in the course of the debates of the Virginia ratifying
convention, John Marshall spoke in rebuttal to the objections of George
Mason and Patrick Henry to article III:
Here are tribunals appointed for the decision of controversies
which were before either not at all, or improperly, provided for.
That many benefits will result from this to the members of the
collective society, every one confesses. Unless its organization be
defective, and so constructed as to injure, instead of accommodat-
ing, the convenience of the people, it merits our approbation....
... With respect to its cognizance in all cases arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, [Mr. Henry] says that,
the laws of the United States being paramount to the laws of the
particular states, there is no case but what this will extend to. Has
the government of the United States power to make laws on every
subject? . . . If they were to make a law not warranted by any of
the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an
infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They
would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction.
They would declare it void.8'
THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR A NATIONAL JUDICIARY
To implement article III of the Constitution, a Committee for Or-
ganizing the Judiciary was established by the Senate on April 7, 1789. It
consisted of a representative of each of the 10 states then represented in
the upper house of the First Congress8 2: Paine Wingate of New Hamp-
shire, Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut,
William Paterson of New Jersey, William Maclay of Pennsylvania,
Richard Bassett of Delaware, Charles Carroll of Maryland, Richard
Henry Lee of Virginia, Ralph Izard of South Carolina, and William
Few of Georgia. 3 Five of the members had attended the Philadelphia
Convention, seven had served in the Continental Congress, and two had
helped draft the constitutions for their states.
Ellsworth, the future third Chief Justice of the United States, had
the most extensive judicial experience, 4 years (1777-81) on the standing
81. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATEs, supra note 76, at 551-53.
82. The Senators from New York did not take their seats until the second session of
the First Congress. North Carolina and Rhode Island did not ratify the Constitution
until 1789 and 1790, respectively.
83. See 1 J. Goa BE_, supra note 10, at 458-59.
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committee on prize case appeals of the Continental Congress, as well as
service as a member of the governor's council (1784-1807) and as judge
of the Superior Court of Connecticut (1785-89). At the Philadelphia
Convention, though he represented one of the small states not generally
sympathetic to a concept of a strong central government, he had firmly
advocated giving adequate power to the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial branches, and at the Connecticut ratifying convention in January,
1788, he had declared: "If the United States... make a law which the
Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the
national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made inde-
pendent, will declare it to be void." "
Ellsworth's vision of a strong and independent federal judiciary was
reflected in the final form of the Judiciary Act.85 The statute dealt
with three major areas: organization,"' jurisdiction, 7 and procedure.88
Although it failed to satisfy all parties, the Act carried forward the con-
cept of a national judiciary envisioned in article III while satisfying the
most strenuous objections of the anti-Federalists.
Article III stipulated that there was to be "one supreme court" and
assumed a system of subordinate courts, which the Committee for Or-
ganizing the Judiciary quickly determined should be federal courts
rather than state courts vested with jurisdiction -over federal matters.89
Although the Committee might have modeled the lower federal courts
after the system of separate tribunals for law and equity that existed in
a few states,90 the more common two-tier state court organization of
nisi prius and circuit tribunals was followed.91 This structure was better
suited to a federal system: each federal district court had jurisdiction
only within one state, thus assuaging an expressed concern that federal
judicial districts otherwise would teid to obliterate state lines and ex-
84. THE JusTicEs oF ThE UNITED STATES SUPREME COuRT, 1789-1969, at 228 (L. Friedman
& F. Israel eds. 1969) (biographical sketch by M. Kraus).
85. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
86. Id. §§ 1-8.
87. id. §§ 9-13.
88. Id. §§ 14-35.
89. See 1 J. GoEEL, supra note 10, at 458-63.
90. Cf. id. at 475-79. Chancery was a separate court only in a few states, such as New
Jersey, Delaware, and Virginia.
91. Cf. id. at 472. The concept of district courts was not a novel one; Virginia and
North Carolina had organized their trial courts by district. See, e.g., 12 Hen. (Va.) 730
(ch. 67, 1788).
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tinguish or subordinate state jurisprudence. 92 The three circuits effec-
tively utilized the time of the Supreme Court Justices, who were kept
"in touch with the country" by sitting with the district judges."' In
practice, the statutory plan soon proved cumbersome; the Act required
amendment regularly as new states came into the Union, and circuit lines
had to be continually redrawn.94
TABLE IV. ORGANIZATION OF FIRST FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Jurisdiction
Type of Court Organization Original Appellate
court of final instance Chief Justice; suits between all other
Supreme Court five Associate states, or with casesb
Justices states as party;
suits involving
foreign officersa
courts of primary instance Eastern, Middle, felonies; civil cases from
circuit courts Southernc suits over $500d district
courtse
district courts one for each misdemeanors;
state and for admiralty; civil
the Maine district of suits up to $500f
Massachusetts, and the
Kentucky district of
Virginia
a U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Star. 73.
bId.
cAct of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 4, 5, 1 Star. 73. The Eastern Circuit was made up of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York; the Middle Circuit con-
sisted of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia; the Southern
Circuit included South Carolina and Georgia.
d id. §§ 11, 12. The latter section provided for removal of causes from state courts in
cases of diversity of citizenship.
eId. § 11.
fId. § 9. District courts were given concurrent jurisdiction with state courts in tort
actions involving aliens or foreign law, and exclusive jurisdiction over local foreign
officials, such as consuls. Section 10 gave certain broader powers to the district courts
in the Maine and Kentucky districts.
92. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73.
93. Id. § 4.
94. See Act of June 4, 1790, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 126 (establishing federal courts in North
Carolina); Act of June 23, 1790, ch. 21, 1 Star. 128 (establishing federal courts in Rhode
Island).
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Subject matter jurisdiction and original and appellate jurisdictions of
the national courts largely had been determined by section 2 of article
III, but the statutory provisions sought to accommodate the states by
further limiting causes cognizable in the federal district courts. These
tribunals were granted exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters "cog-
nizable under the authority of the United States," in admiralty cases,
and in cases involving minor foreign officials. They had concurrent
jurisdiction both with state courts and with the new circuit courts in
tort claims arising out of international law and in suits brought by the
United States when the amount in controversy exceeded $100.", The
jurisdiction of the circuit courts was original as to suits brought by the
United States involving amounts in excess of $500 after costs, diversity
of citizenship, and major federal criminal acts; appellate jurisdiction
existed over certain cases from the district courts.9 6 A guarantee of jury
trials, soon to be reiterated in the Bill of Rights, offered further assur-
ance to those who believed that interstate litigation under a national
judiciary posed a threat to an individual removed from his vicinage.9 7
The procedural provisions of the Judiciary Act followed the familiar
common law traditions adapted in colonial times and continued in the
new states. Section 34 stipulated that "the laws of the several states,
except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States
shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where
they apply." 98 By providing for deference to state law, except in federal
questions, the authors of the Act further appeased opponents of an ex-
tensive national judiciary.
The seedtime for the American national judiciary had extended for
the 14 year period from 1775 to 1789; in the ensuing 11 years, until
John Marshall became Chief Justice of the United States, the seedlings
were cultivated as the new court system was tested in operation. This
was a period of relative quiescence; the extensive usurpation of state
judicial authority that had been feared by some did not materialize.
By 1801, of 87 cases appealed to the Supreme Court, only 7 had come
from state tribunals. 9 Admiralty cases, for which exclusive jurisdiction
95. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73.
96. Id. §§ 11, 12.
97. See 2 REcoiws OF Tm FDERAL CONVENTION., supra note 26, at 635-40.
98. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73.
99. See 1 J. GoEBEL, supra note 10, at 802.
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in the federal courts had been demanded, constituted nearly half of the
litigation before the Supreme Court during its first decade.1°° Moreover
the decisions of the Supreme Court in this period had no striking effect
on decisions in state courts or in federal courts applying state law: two-
thirds of the 61 cases pursued to final adjudication resulted in affirmances
of the judgments of the courts of origin.101 Although the jurisdiction of
the federal courts was being imposed, and to that extent the power of
state courts diminished, the quiet manner of this accomplishment created
an environment in which the seedlings of both state and national judicial
processes at last could take firm root.
100. See id. at 807.
101. See id. at 811.
